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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
BRIAN LYNN ENGLEHORN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 930707-CA 
Priority No. 15 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(i) (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Plaintiff has appealed an order by the Fifth District 
Court, Iron County, State of Utah which dismissed Plaintiff's 
complaint with prejudice and on the merits, and allowed the 
Defendant the opportunity to request attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the Trial Court properly hold that Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) (1953, as amended), cannot be applied to the 
relationship of these parties to give rise to a valid statutory 
unsolemnized marriage? 
2. Does the Court of Appeals lack jurisdiction in this 
matter because Appellant did not timely pay the Court filing fees? 
3. Is the "Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" an 
appealable order? 
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4. May Appellant Bunch raise issues for the first time on 
appeal? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues before the Court center on whether the Trial Court 
properly applied the law in ruling that Plaintiff's claim of a 
common-law marriage must be dismissed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) (1953, as amended), in ruling that Defendant is 
entitled to ask for attorney fees pursuant to Sec. 78-27-56 (1953, 
as amended), whether the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction in 
these matters, and whether Bunch may raise issues for the first 
time on appeal. These issues all raise questions of law. 
Questions of law are reviewed under a correctness of error 
standard, giving no deference to the Trial Court. Hales v. 
Industrial Com'n of Utah, 854 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah App. 1993); 
Velarde v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Com'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah 
App. 1992); Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5 
Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this 
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative order 
establishes that it arises out of a contract between two consenting 
parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legal capable of entering a solemnized marriage under 
the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obligations; 
and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a uniform 
and general reputation as husband and wife. 
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(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage under 
this section must occur during the relationship described in 
Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination of 
that relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable under this 
section may be manifested in any form, and may be proved under the 
same general rules of evidence as facts in other cases. 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 21-7-3 
Impecunious litigants - Affidavit. 
Any person may institute, prosecute, defend and appeal any 
cause in any court in this state by taking and subscribing, before 
any officer authorized to administer an oath, the following: 
I,A B, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that owing to my poverty 
I am unable to bear the expenses of the action or legal proceedings 
which I am about to commence (or the appeal which I am about to 
take), and that I verily believe I am justly entitled to the relief 
sought by such action, legal proceedings or appeal. 
Rule 3, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which 
an appeal is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to 
the appellate court, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall 
be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after the 
date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. However, 
when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry 
or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 
3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days 
after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
Rule 6, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Bond for costs on appeal. 
Except in a criminal case, at the time of filing the notice of 
appeal, the appellant shall file with the notice a bond for costs 
on appeal, unless the bond is waived in writing by the adverse 
party, or unless an affidavit as provided for in Section 21-7-3, 
Utah Code Ann. 1953 as amended, is filed. The bond shall be in the 
sum of at least $300.00 or such greater amount as the trial court 
may order on motion of the appellee to ensure payment of costs on 
appeal. No separate bond for costs on appeal is required when a 
supersedeas bond is files. The bond on appeal shall be with 
sufficient sureties and shall be conditioned to secure payment of 
costs if the appeal is dismissed or the judgment affirmed, or of 
such costs as the appellate court may award if the judgment is 
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modified. The adverse party may except to the sufficiency of the 
sureties in accordance with the provisions of Rule 62(i), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 54(a) and (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules 
includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A 
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a 
master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple 
parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an 
action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-
party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court 
may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but 
fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay 
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than 
all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the 
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or 
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all 
the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Barbara Lynn Bunch ("Bunch") filed a complaint 
against Appellee Brian Lynn Englehorn ("Englehorn") alleging a 
common law marriage pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5 (1953, 
as amended) and asking for a divorce. She did not request a 
judicial determination as to existence of a "marriage" at any time. 
Englehorn filed an answer denying any entitlement to a divorce. 
The matter came on for trial more than a year after Bunch and 
Englehorn terminated their "relationship". At trial, counsel for 
Englehorn moved the Court to dismiss the action pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) because more than a year had elapsed 
since the termination of the relationship. The Trial Court granted 
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Englehorn's motion on that basis. The Court also ruled that 
Englehorn could ask for attorney fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 78-27-56 (1953, as amended). Bunch filed a Notice of Appeal, 
but did not pay the requisite Court filing fee. She instead 
alleged impecuniosity. Englehorn challenged the validity of the 
impecuniosity claims and petitioned the Court to strike the Notice 
of Appeal, and dismiss the appeal on the basis that no filing fee 
was submitted with the Notice of Appeal. The District Court denied 
Englehorn's motion. Bunch now raises various arguments never 
presented to the Trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Englehorn accepts Bunch's statement of facts as accurate for 
the purposes of argument. In addition thereto, Englehorn submits 
the following facts regarding Englehorn's appeal of the District 
Court's "Memorandum Opinion and Order" executed by the Honorable J. 
Philip Eves, on or about April 14, 1994: 
1. On November 10, 1993 Bunch filed a "Notice of Appeal" 
with the Fifth District Court appealing the "Judgment of Dismissal 
with Prejudice" of the Honorable J. Philip Eves entered October 12, 
1993. (Record on Appeal p. 000117) Bunch did not pay the requisite 
filing fee in connection with the filing of the Notice of Appeal, 
nor did she file a cost bond required, but alleged her 
impecuniosity and filed an "Affidavit of Impecuniosity" with 
"Affidavit Supporting Impecuniosity Request" on November 10, 1993. 
(Record on Appeal p.p. 000118-000122) 
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2. Thereafter, because of deficiencies in the purported 
"Affidavit of Impecuniosity" and the purported "Affidavit 
Supporting Impecuniosity Request" dated November 5, 1993, Bunch 
purported to file another purported "Affidavit of Impecuniosity" 
and another "Affidavit Supporting Impecuniosity Request", these 
documents being filed with the Fifth District Court on December 29, 
1993. (Record on Appeal p.p. 000126-000132) 
3. On January 12, 1993 an "Affidavit" of Teresa Sunderland 
was filed with the Fifth District Court. (Record on Appeal p.p. 
00158-00166) Affiant, Teresa Sunderland, stated in her affidavit 
that she was a notary public of the State of Utah; and that on or 
about November 8, 1983, an individual identified through 
documentation to be Barbara L. Bunch, appeared before her. 
4. At that time, Barbara L. Bunch signed a document entitled 
"Affidavit of Impecuniosity" and another entitled "Affidavit 
Supporting Impecuniosity Request". Although Bunch signed the 
documents before the notary, Bunch did not raise her hand, and did 
not swear an oath. The notary did not administer an oath to Bunch, 
did not personally know Barbara Lynn Bunch, and identified her only 
by her Utah driver's license, No. 14616368. (Record on Appeal p.p. 
00158-00159) 
5. This matter came before the Court of Appeals upon 
Englehorn's 17 December, 1993 "Motion to Strike" Bunch's "Affidavit 
of Impecuniosity", and "Motion to Dismiss the Appeal". (See Court 
Records) On December 28, 1993 Bunch filed a memorandum in response 
to Englehorn's December 17, 1993 motion. (See Court Records) The 
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matter was temporarily remanded to the Fifth District Court, Iron 
County, for consideration of Englehorn's motions. (Record on 
Appeal p. 00168) 
6. On April 14, 1994 the Fifth District Court, Iron County, 
issued a "Memorandum Opinion and Order" denying Englehorn's "Motion 
to Strike Notice of Appeal" and "Motion to Dismiss Appeal". 
(Record on Appeal p. 00211) On April 28, 1994 Appellee filed a 
"Notice of Appeal" appealing the "Memorandum Opinion and Order". 
(Record on Appeal p. 00217) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The institution of marriage is a creation of statute and is 
subject to regulation by its Legislature. For decades the Utah 
Legislation chose to allow marriage only if solemnized by an 
authorized person. However, with the passing of Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 30-1-4.5 in 1987 the Legislature authorized recognition of 
common-law marriages if certain conditions were met. Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) provides that the determination or 
establishment of marriage by a Court or administrative order must 
occur during the relationship described in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-
1-4.5(1) or within one year following the termination of that 
relationship. In the case at bar no determination or decree was 
obtained within one year from the termination of the relationship, 
thus the Trial Court was correct in dismissing Bunch's complaint 
with prejudice and on the merits. 
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In her effort to appeal the decision of the District Court, 
Bunch failed timely to pay the Court filing fee. This invalidates 
the appeal. 
The "Judgment of Dismissal with Prejudice" is not a final 
order and therefore not appealable. 
Bunch may not raise arguments on appeal which were not 
presented to the Trial Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IF THE STATE LEGISLATURE CAN REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE A COMMON-LAW 
MARRIAGE, THEN IT CAN SET FORTH THE REQUIREMENTS TO ESTABLISH A 
COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE. 
The power to regulate marriage is a right reserved exclusively 
to the respective states. In re Ann Goalen, 512 P.2d 1028, 1030 
(Utah 1973); Baehr V. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 58 (1993); In re the 
Marriage of Frank, 542 P.2d 845, 850 (1975); Singer V. Hara, 522 
P.2d 1187, 1197 (1974). The Court in Baehr stated: 
"By its very nature, the power to regulate the 
marriage relation includes the power to 
determine the requisite of a valid marriage 
contract and to control the qualifications of 
the contracting parties, the forms and 
procedures necessary to solemnize the 
marriage, the duties and the obligation it 
creates, its effect upon property and other 
rights and the grounds for marital 
dissolution." Baehr at P. 58 
The Baehr Court further stated: 
"notwithstanding the state's acknowledged 
stewardship over the institution of marriage, 
the extent of permissible state regulation of 
the right of access to the marital 
relationship is subject to constitutional 
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limitations. It has been held that a state 
may deny the right to marry only for 
compelling reasons." Baehr at P. 59 
In the present case the state is not denying Bunch the right 
to marry, but is simply regulating the procedures necessary to 
validate a marriage. This is certainly a permissible right of the 
state. 
Prior to the passage of the Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5, 
enacted in 1987, a marriage had to be consummated by ceremony as 
provided by statute since common-law marriages were not recognized 
in the state of Utah. Johnson v. Johnson, 207 P.2d 1036, 1040 
(Utah 1949); In re Vetas' Estate, 170 P.2d 183, 184 (Utah 1946); 
Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 43 P.2d 696, 697 (Utah 1935); 
Mattes v. Olearain, 759 P.2d 1177, 1181 (Utah App. 1988). 
Certainly if the State Legislature can refuse to honor a 
common-law marriage, it can set forth the reguirements to establish 
a common-law marriage. That is what the State Legislature did with 
the enactment of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended). 
This statute provides a way to have a relationship validated as a 
common-law marriage. It is not an unconstitutional restriction on 
the access to marriage, as Bunch would have us believe, but is 
another avenue the State Legislature has provided for validating a 
marriage. Bunch, in fact, never did request the judicial or 
administrative validation of the relationship required by the 
statute, so her arguments hold no water. Further, the law she 
cites in her support is very easily distinguishable, and does not 
apply to the facts in this case. 
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POINT II 
THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP MANDATES CERTAINTY 
The Court in Vetas, Supra, sets forth the following purposes 
for requiring a formal validation of a marriage: 
"...is doubtless to protect the parties to the 
marriage contract in the rights flowing 
therefrom, and likewise to protect the 
offspring. A solemn record of the contract is 
made to which recourse may be had when rights 
or obligations of the husband or wife arising 
from the marriage are in issue. So, too, are 
the interest of third parties in dealing with 
either of the contracting parties, subsequent 
to the marriage, thus protected." 
Accordingly, to protect these interests there should be 
certainty as to whether a marital relationship exists. Conversely, 
when a marriage relationship is terminated, there must be certainty 
as to its termination. The Court in Johnson, Supra, stated with 
regard to the certainty as to the states of marriage: 
"All the elements of public policy and policy 
of the law which go to favor reconciliation 
during the interlocutory period, and 
preservation of the marital status, are at an 
end when the status of marriage has been 
dissolved, and there arises a policy of the 
law favoring certainty in the preservation and 
maintenance of the rights which the 
declaration of termination of marital status 
creates. Any other rule would lead to 
uncertainty and chaos which would plague both 
the courts and society, and which would not be 
justified in preserving marriages theretofore 
dissolved. The obvious and ready remedy, that 
of requiring the parties to remarry, is so 
accessible to all who desire to perpetuate 
their marital status, that we are impelled to 
require this as an adequate substitute where 
the parties find themselves as did these 
parties, with a declaration that the marriage 
has been dissolved." 
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In the present case the Appellant would have the Court impose 
uncertainty upon Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5 by allowing the 
statute to be deemed a statute of limitations rather than a statute 
of repose. The Supreme Court has differentiated the two: 
A statute of limitations requires a lawsuit to 
be filed within a specified period of time 
after a legal right has been violated or the 
remedy for the wrong committed is deemed 
waived. Berry by and through Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985); 
A statute of repose bars all actions after a 
specified period of time has run from the 
occurrence of some event other than the 
occurrence of an injury that gives rise to a 
cause of action. Id. 
To allow the statute to be interpreted as a statute of 
limitations is fraught with problems. For example, it is not 
unusual for a lawsuit to last for years. Thus, the parties to the 
lawsuit may have to wait years for a determination as to their 
marital status. Or what about a "latent" claim that a party 
alleges years after the separation, should that party be allowed to 
toll the statute, also? Without Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5 there 
is no common-law marriage in Utah. Johnson, Supra. Thus, the only 
right that a party has to a common-law marriage is created by the 
statute itself. No statute, no right. Accordingly, declaring the 
statute as a statute of repose does not divest a party of any right 
he or she may otherwise have after the statutory period for the 
establishing a common-law marriage, because he or she has no other 
right. The statute merely tells her how to exercise what rights it 
grants her. 
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Further, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) is not offensive to 
Article 1, Sec. 7 and Article 1, Sec. 11 of the Utah Constitution 
because it gives the party relying on the statute ample opportunity 
to be heard (Article 7) and ample access to the courts (Article 
11). It denies neither of these rights. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-
4.5(2) reads as follows: 
The determination or establishment of a 
marriage under this section must occur during 
the relationship described in Subsection (1), 
or within one year following the termination 
of that relationship. Evidence of a marriage 
recognizable under this section may be 
manifested in any form, and may be proved 
under the same general rules of evidence as 
facts in other cases. 
In establishing a common-law marriage, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-
1-4.5(2) is clear as to the time frame in which the marriage must 
be validated. Thus, those relying on the Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-
4.5 know when the relationship will exist as a common-law marriage 
and when it will not. It is not a statute that tramples on future 
or latent rights, but is a statute that demands certainty in the 
establishment of a common-law marriage, and is merely a regulation 
of the requisites of a valid marriage. 
In the present situation, Bunch failed to ask to have the 
relationship established to be a marriage by a "court or 
administrative order" within the time limits set forth in Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5(2). Appellant in no way was denied the 
opportunity to be heard nor was she denied access to the courts. 
For example, upon filing her complaint she could have requested the 
District Court make a declaration as to the status of the 
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relationship. She did not even ask for such relief. By her own 
volition she did not pursue a common-law marriage as required by 
statute, thus, failing this critical step necessary for its 
validation, even though its need was pointed out to her in 
Englehorn's Verified Answer, Fifth Defense, at page 4. (R-000017) 
POINT III 
THE APPEALS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL. 
Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that in 
order to be effective, the Notice of Appeal required by Rule 3, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, must be filed with the Clerk of 
the Trial Court within 30 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from. Rule 3(f), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, requires payment of a filing fee at the time 
of filing a notice of appeal. Utah Code Ann. Sec. 21-7-3 (1953, as 
amended), permits an impecunious person to circumvent the fee and 
bond requirements of Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 6, by 
filing an affidavit of impecuniosity. 
In connection with the filing of an affidavit of 
impecuniosity, Utah Code Ann. Sec. 21-7-3 (1953, as amended), 
requires that the person seeking the benefits of the statute, swear 
to an oath. 
An "oath" consists of a solemn declaration, manifestation of 
an intent to be bound by the statement, the signature of the 
declarant and acknowledgment by an authorized person that the oath 
was taken. McKniqht v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726, 734 (Utah, 
1963). Specifically, to constitute an "oath" within the meaning of 
13 
statutes requiring an act to be done under oath, there must be some 
outward formality, and some manifestation of intention to place the 
affiant under penalty and obligation of an oath. There must be 
definite evidence that the affiant was not only conscious that he 
or she was taking an oath, but there must be some outward act form 
which that consciousness can be definitely inferred, which cannot 
be done from the mere signature to an printed form of an oath. 
Spangler v. District Court of Salt Lake County, et al, 140 P.2d 
755, 758 (Utah, 1943). 
In this case, Bunch did nothing more with respect to her 
"affidavits" than appear before a notary public and sign the 
documents. She did not raise her hand. She did not take an oath. 
In fact, the notary public says that no oath was administered. The 
purported "Affiant" made no outward manifestation which could be 
construed to be an oath. 
As a result, Bunch's attempt to avoid costs through the filing 
of an affidavit of impecuniosity, necessarily fails. She is thrown 
back on the requirement that, like the rest of the public, she must 
pay a filing fee. She did not pay any filing fee, nor file a valid 
affidavit of impecuniosity, before November 12, 1993, the deadline 
for filing a notice of appeal. 
The Clerk may not file a notice of appeal until he or she has 
received the appropriate filing fee, or substitute. In McLain v. 
Conrad, 431 P.2d 571 (Utah, 1967), a notice of appeal was left at 
the Clerk's office before the expiration of the time for filing, 
but the filing fee was not paid until after expiration of the time 
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for filing, and the Clerk did not file the notice until the fee was 
paid. The Utah Supreme Court held that the notice was untimely 
filed and the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
In this case, Bunch tried to avoid the necessity of paying a 
filing fee by filing a purported "Affidavit of Impecuniosity". She 
did not swear to any oath, nor was any oath administered by the 
notary public. She only signed the "Affidavit" before the notary 
public. Such signing, lacking any raising of the hand or other 
outward manifestation of an intention to take an oath, and to be 
bound, is insufficient to create an oath or affidavit. Since no 
filing fee was timely paid, the "filing" of the notice of appeal is 
a nullity, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to do anything other 
than dismiss the appeal, after first striking the notice of appeal, 
it having been "filed" without the payment of the required fee. 
POINT IV 
THE "JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE" IS NOT AN APPEALABLE 
ORDER. 
Rule 54(a) of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure states in 
pertinent part that a "Judgment as used in these rules includes a 
decree and any order from which an appeal lies." Rule 54(b) 
explains that unless all claims are adjudicated absent a specific 
finding that no just reason for delay exists and judgment should be 
entered, any order or other form of decision , however called, does 
not terminate the action. 
In the present case, no final order or judgment was rendered 
by the Trial Court. Issues remained for decision. No 
certification under Rule 54(b) was made. The Court only made an 
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interim ruling that Englehorn could seek attorney fees, but made no 
final decision as to the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, or 
even it they would be awarded. 
In First Security Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298, 299 (Utah 
1991), and A. J. MacKay Co. v. Okland Construction Company, 817 
P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court held that where 
issues and parties remained before the Trial Court, and where no 
certification as provided for by Rule 54(b) was made, the orders 
appealed from were not final, were not appealable, and the 
appropriate remedy was dismissal of the appeals. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT BUNCH MAY NOT RAISE ON APPEAL ISSUES NOT PRESENTED NOR 
ARGUED TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
Plaintiff Bunch argues that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5, 
(1) is a statute of repose rather than of limitations, which it is; 
(2) that the statute cited violates the "open courts" provision, 
Article I, Section II, Utah Constitution; (3) that it violates 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution pertaining to "due 
process of law"; (4) that the statute should be interpreted as one 
of limitation, not repose; and (5) that no attorney fees should be 
awarded. Not one of those arguments was ever presented or made to 
the Trial Court, with the possible exception of the "limitation vs. 
repose" argument in a very vague way. (See R-000145 through R-
000152) . 
Defenses and claims not raised in the Trial Court cannot be 
raised for the first time on appeal. Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 
P.2d 100, 102 (Utah 1983). Where there is no indication in the 
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record on appeal that the Trial Court reached or ruled on an issue, 
the Court of Appeals will not undertake to consider the issue on 
appeal. Broberq v. Hess, 782 P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App., 1989). 
Not having ever presented or made her current arguments to the 
Trial Judge, the same cannot now be raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court properly 
recognized that Bunch did not meet the requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 30-1-4.5(2) in her effort to have a relationship deemed 
a common-law marriage. Since no filing fee was timely paid, the 
filing of the "Notice of Appeal" is void. The "Judgment of 
Dismissal with Prejudice" is not a final order and is thus not to 
be heard by this Court. Bunch cannot raise arguments for the first 
time on appeal. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the District 
Court's decision, and dismiss the appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this IZU~- day of CL^^J^T ^ 1994. 
WILLARD R. BISHOP 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) full, true and correct 
copies of the above document to Stephen Julien, Esquire, at 216 
South 200 West, Cedar City, UT 84720, by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, this /zffiL> day of August, 1994. 
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TITLE II. 
APPEAL? FROM JUDGMENTS AND OliDLIiS OF 
TUIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final o r d e r s a n d j u d g m e n t s . An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or cncuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal flora all final ordeis and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, b} filing a notice of appeal with the ckrk ol the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is giound only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consol idated a p p e a l s . If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may jem in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate t i r cK notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence cf the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate ihe court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a c^py 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or. if the 
party is r.A represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(0 Filing and docket ing fees in civil appea l s . At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees a* are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal m the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice cf appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docket ing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appea1, shoving the date of its filing, the docket-
ing fee, and a copy of the bond required bv Rule G i r a certification by the 
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court Upon 
receipt cf the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing tee, *he clerk of 
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the1 docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action m the trial court, with the appel-
lant identified as Mich, but if the titl«» '1<)<>, not contain ihe name cf the appel-
lant, cuch name ^hall he added to the titU 
(Amended effective Octohei 1 ilY.L} » 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
By: Stephen W. Julien, #1765 
P.O. Box 1538 
216 South 200 West /-ST **" " 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 n / ] ^ ^ v ^ 
Telephone: 586-2571 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH, a/k/a * 
BARBARA LYNN ENGLEHORN, * VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
• 
Plaintiff, * 
* 
vs. 
BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN, * Civil No. °\ \ ^\ °t Q GC S>7 
Defendant. * 
* 
COMES NOW, the plaintiff above named for cause of action 
against the above-named defendant, complains and alleges as 
follows: 
1. That plaintiff is now and for more than three months 
last past has been a bona fide resident of Iron County, State of 
Utah. 
2. That the parties are validly married to each other under 
Section 30-1-4.5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as Amended though they 
never solemnized the marriage. The parties began living together 
in March 1979 in Brian Head, Iron County, Utah, and continued to 
live together by agreement until August 18, 1990. During that 
period of time, the parties have mutually assumed marital rights, 
duties and obligations, and have held themselves out as husband and 
wife. Both parties are capable of consenting to a marital 
Barbara Bunch,a/k/a,Engeihorn v. Brian Lynn Engelhorn 
Verified Complaint 
relationship and legally capable of entering a solemnized marriage 
under Utah Lav/. 
3. That there are no children born as issue of this marriage, 
and none are expected. 
4. That there have been irreconcilable differences making it 
impossible to continue the marriage relationship. 
5. That during the marriage the parties have acquired certain 
personal property, and that it is just and equitable that it be 
divided as follows: 
To 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
the plaintiff: 
1980 Subaru authomobile 
King-size bed 
25" color television 
Refrigerator 
Washer 
Dryer 
Freezer 
308 Remington rifle 
14-foot sailboat 
Two kayaks 
Skis 
Microwave oven and stan 
Dinette set 
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14. Ceramic art work, including large 
rust colored plate & 1 set of cups 
15. Mug collecion 
16. Hope chest 
17. Sewing machine 
18. Blender 
19. Linens and towels 
20. Pots and pans 
21. Wicker chair 
22. Dinnerware 
23. Utensils 
24. Large trampoline 
25. Small trampoline 
26. Mountain bike 
27. Ten-speed road bike 
28. Raft with equipment 
29. Four photo albums 
30. Scrap books 
31. Lawn mower 
32. Weedeater 
33. Painting of Parowan Valley in rain storm 
34. One red standstone photo 
35. Two oak picture frames 
36. Ironing board 
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37. Iron 
38. Quilted wall hanging given by her mother 
39. Utility trailer 
40. Two-drawer oak filing cabinet 
41. Dishwasher 
42. Two crock pots 
43. One nightstand 
44. Spice rack 
45. Barbecue utensils 
46. Water filter 
47. Large folding table 
48. Ironwood carving 
49. Large picture of arch in oak frame 
50. Two lamps 
51. Toaster 
52. One-half of the potted plants 
53. One couch, jungle print 
54. One set of speakers 
55. Hoses and sprinklers 
56. One vacuum cleaner 
57. Chest of drawers 
58. Sears stereo 
59. Her personal effects and belongings. 
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B. To the defendant: 
1. 1959 Willeys automobile 
2. 1968 Chevrolet pickup 
3. 1981 Tyota Corolla automobile 
4. One vacuum cleaner 
5. Kenwood stereo 
6. One red standstone photo 
7. 19° color television 
8. Queen-size bed 
9. One black couch 
10. Telescope 
11. Coffee maker 
12. One-half of the potted plants 
13. One lamp 
14. One night stand 
15. Chest of drawers 
16. His personal effects and belongings. 
6* That the parties have acquired a home located at 47 
Pioneer Way, Parowan, Iron County, Utah, legally described as: 
Commencing at a point 12 feet South 
and 9 rods 3 1/2 feet West of the 
Northeast Corner of Lot 19. Block 13 
Plat A, Parowan City survey, and 
running thence South 7 rods 4 1/2 feet 
thence West 85 feet, thence North 7 
rods 4 1/2 feet thence East 85 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH all rights, privileges, 
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easements, rights-of way, improvments, 
and appurtenances thereunto belonging 
or in anyway appertaining. 
TOGETHER WITH 1 hour of Water from the 
Parowan City Irrigation Water Company. 
and that it is just and equitable that said home be awarded to 
plaintiff subject to all debts and encumbrances thereof. 
7. That the parties have acquired five acres at the Castle 
Valley River Ranches, Utah, and that it is just and equtiable that 
said property be awarded to defendant subject to all debts and 
encumbrances thereon. 
8. That each of the parties should be responsible for their 
own debts in their own names since their separation on August 18, 
1990, and that it is just and equitable that plaintiff pay the debt 
owed to FMHA for the loan on the home and that defendant pay all 
other debts of the marriage incurred by the parties while they were 
together, and that defendant should hold plaintiff harmless 
thereof, including: 
A. Property taxes owned on the home of the parties. 
9. That plaintiff should be awarded a reasonable amount as 
alimony. 
10. That each of the parties should be awarded one-half of all 
11. That plaintiff should have her former name of BUNCH 
restored to her. 
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12. That it is just and proper that defendant should be 
restrained from vexing, harassing, annoying, bothering, 
threatening, or abusing plaintiff. 
13. That each party should be responsible for their own 
attorney fees in this matter. 
14. That defendant should be required to pay all court costs. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against the defendant 
as follows: 
1. That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing 
between the aprties be dissolved and held for naught on the grounds 
of irreconcilable differences. 
2. That the personal property acquired during the marriage 
be divided as set forth above. 
3. That the parties have acquired a home located at 47 
Pioneer Way, Parowan, Iron County, Utah, legally described as: 
Commencing at a poing 1/2 feet South 
and 9 rods 3 1/2 feet West of the 
Northweast Corner of Lot 19. Block 13 
Plat A, Parowan City survey, and 
running thence South 7 rods 4 1/2 feet 
thence West 85 feet, thence North 7 
rods 4 1/2 feet thence East 85 feet to 
the point of beginning. 
TOGETHER WITH all rights, privileges, 
easements, rights-of-way, improvements, 
and appurtenances thereunto belonging 
or in anyway appertaining. 
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TOGETHER WITH 1 hour of Water from the 
Parowan City Irrigation Water Company. 
and that said home be awarded to plaintiff subject to all debts and 
encumbrances thereon. 
4. That each of the parties be responsible for their own 
debts in their own names since their separation on August 18, 1990, 
and that it is just and equitable that plaintiff pay the debt owed 
to FMHA for the loan on the home and that defendant pay all other 
debts of the marriage incurred by the parties while they were 
together, and that defendant should hold plaintiff harmless 
thereof, including the debts listed above. 
5. That plaintiff be awarded a reasonable amount as alimony. 
6. That plaintiff should have her former name of BUNCH 
restored to her. 
7. That defendant be restrined from vexing, harassing, 
annoying, bothering, threatening, or abusing plaintiff. 
8. That each party be responsible for their own attorney fees 
in this matter. 
DATED this 
UTAH LfiGAL SERVICES, itfS^. 
A t t o r n e y s f o r M a i n t i f f 
By: Stephen/W/ J u l i e n 
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Plaintiff's address: 
P. 0. Box 484 
Parowan, Utah 84761 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
Barbara Lynn Bunch,a/k/a, Barbara Lynn Englehorn, being first 
duly sworn, deposes and says: That she read the foregoing 
complaint, knows the contents thereof, and that the same are true 
except as to matters which are baed upon information and belief and 
as to those matters she believes them to be true. 
ti^^f „ 
3ARBARA t*YNN "B#NCH, a/k/a 
BARBARA LYNN ENGLEHORN 
In the County of J^i»6A.I * State of Utah, on this 
ft-(7L day of SJ/l\'dA-J&J(* , 1991, before me, the undersigned 
notary, personally appeared /?*h/?**<* /Ol/t/a/C 
who is personally known to me or: "who proved to me her identity 
through documentary evidence in the form of a (JJ^K-lx Z^J>L 
to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence 
and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary 
and the document truthful. 
My Commission Expires: 
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WILLARD R. BISHOP, P. C. 
Willard R. Bishop - #0344 
Attorney for Defendant 
P. 0- Box 279 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0279 
Telephone: (801) 586-9483 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN, 
Defendant. 
VERIFIED ANSWER 
Civil No. °1 1M100OS 7 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, who answers Plaintiff's Verified 
Complaint as follows: 
ANSWER 
FIRST DEFENSE 
(Failure to State Claim) 
1. The Verified Complaint fails to state a claim against 
Defendant upon which relief may be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
(Pleading to the Merits) 
2. Paragraph 1 of the Verified Complaint is denied for lack 
of personal knowledge on the part of Defendant, upon to base a 
reasoned response. Please is put to her burden of proof. 
3. Answering paragraph 2 of the Verified Complaint, Defendant 
admits that for a certain period of time Plaintiff lived with 
on 
Defendant. Defendant admits, upon information and belief, that 
borh parties were capable of consenting to a maritol relationship 
and were legally capable of entering into a solemnized marriage 
under Utah law. Defendant denies all other allegations contained 
in paragraph 2 of the Verified Complaint. 
4. Answering paragraph 3, Defendant admits that no children 
have been born to Plaintiff and Defendant, and that no children are 
expected. Defendant denies the existence of any marriage 
relationship. 
5. Paragraph 4 of the Verified Complaint is denied. 
6. Answering paragraph 5, Defendant denies that there was any 
marriage and therefore, denies that any "division" should take 
place. There is no basis for any such division. All allegations 
of paragraph 5 not specifically treated herein, are hereby denied. 
Defendant asserts that each party is entitled only to those items 
of personal property belonging to him or her in their individual 
capacities. 
7. Paragraph 6 of the Verified Complaint is denied. The home 
located at 47 Pioneer Way, Parowan, Iron County, Utah, is the 
property of Defendant. 
8. Answering paragraph 7, Defendant asserts that any property 
owned by the parties is not subject to division by this Court. 
9. Answering paragraph 8 of the Verified Complaint, Defendant 
admits liability for his debts in his own name, since he incurred 
them. Likewise, Defendant admits that Plaintiff is obligated for 
her own debts. There is no basis for any division or allocation of 
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debts by the Court, since there never has been any marriage between 
the parties. Defendant admits liability for property taxes, since 
the home is his. All allegations of paragraph 8 not specifically 
treated herein are hereby denied. 
10. Paragraph 9 of the Verified Complaint is denied. Since 
there never was any marriage between the parties, there exists no 
entitlement to alimony. Further, even if such an entitlement 
existed, which is denied, Plaintiff is still not entitled to 
alimony, being able to support herself. 
11. Paragraph 10 of the Verified Complaint is denied. No 
basis exists to divide or allocate property between the parties 
since they never were married. 
12. Answering paragraph 11, Defendant denies the same. 
Plaintiffs name is, in fact, "Bunch". There has never been any 
marriage, nor has Plaintiff ever been named "Engelhorn". 
13. Paragraph 12 of the Verified Complaint is denied. 
Further, it is redundant. 
14. Answering paragraph 13, Defendant admits that Plaintiff 
should be responsible for her own attorney fees in this matter. 
Defendant asserts, however, that Plaintiff should pay his attorney 
fees. 
15. Paragraph 14 of the Verified Complaint is denied. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
(Statute Prospective Only) 
16. UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), was effective beginning 
in early 1987, and was prospective in nature only. It cannot be 
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applied to the alleged and nonexistent "marriage" between Plaintiff 
and Defendant. See Layton v. Layton, 777 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) . 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
(Statute for Welfare Purposes Only) 
17. Upon information and belief, Defendant asserts that UCA 
30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), was intended to be applied to the so-
called "common law marriage" only when the State of Utah desired to 
recover welfare benefits of some sort. As a result, the statute is 
not applicable to the "relationship" v/hich previously existed 
between these parties. 
FIFTH DEFENSE 
(Action Not Timely) 
18. Even if UCA 30-1-4.5 (1953, as amended), were applicable, 
which Defendant denies, Plaintiff's action v/ould be barred by the 
provisions of UCA 30-1-4.5(2) (1953, as amended), for the reason 
that more than one year has passed since the termination of such 
alleged "relationship". 
SIXTH DEFENSE 
(Additional Defenses Not Waived) 
19. Defendant may have additional defenses, not now known to 
him, but which may be discovered during the course of these 
proceedings. Defendant does not waive such defenses, and hereby 
specifically asserts them, and reserves the right to amend to set 
them out in detail as the same are discovered. 
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SEVENTH DEFENSE 
(Bad Faith) 
20. Plaintiff's action has been and is without merit, and has 
been filed in bad faith. Defendant is entitled to an award of his 
attorney fees pursuant to the provisions of UCA 78-27-56 (1953, as 
amended). 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Plaintiff's Verified 
Complaint, Defendant prays that the same be dismissed without more, 
that he be awarded his costs and attorney fees pursuant to UCA 
78-27-56 (1953, as amended), that Plaintiff take nothing by her 
Verified Complaint, and that Defendant be awarded such other and 
further relief as the Court deems appropriate under the 
circumstances of this case, including costs, attorney fees, and 
interest. 
DATED this >? ^  day of July, 1991. 
BRIAN LYNN 
State of Utah ) 
: ss. 
County of Iron ) 
COMES NOW BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN, Defendant named above, who 
being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states that he is the 
Defendant named above, that he has read and is familiar with the 
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.matters set forth in the within and foregoing Verified Answer and 
Counterclaim, and that the same are true, according to his own best 
knowledge, information, and belief. 
DATED this 5?5" day of July, 1991. 
BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this t_ day of July, 
1991. 
* BARBARA W R I G H T ' " ^ 
/ C c l r G ' L:^ O4720 {. NOTARY PUBLIC J 
j My Co'rmiss'on Expires Sept 2,1992 K 
$y*'c6iiMZsstvfa^&%p±'t&s:i- Residing in: 
-? 
APPROVED FOR FILING: 
/ 
WILLARD R. BISHC 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a full, true and correct copy 
of the within and foregoing document to Mr. Stephen W. Julien, 
Esq., Attorney at Law, of Utah Legal Services, Inc., at P. 0. Box 
1538, Cedar City, Utch 84721-1538, by first-class mail, postage 
fully prepaid this 'Z.tetf? day of July, 1991. 
Q
 t , 
Secretary , I 
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4 THE COURT: That brings us to 91-0057, Bunch 
5 versus Englehorn. 
6 MR. HOLM: We're ready to proceed, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: In this case, there is also a motion 
8 for a continuance. 
9 I Is that now moot? 
10 J MR. BISHOP: It is — well, not moot. The 
11 Court's ruled on it, and there is — there should be on the 
12 table in front of the Court an order reflecting the Court's 
13 ruling. It's been approved by counsel. 
14 THE COURT: Well, your order contains a denial 
15 cf the motion to amend the Complaint. 
16 Was that also — 
17 MR. BISHOP: That was done too. 
18 THE COURT: Was that also done during our phone 
19 conference? 
2 0 MR. BISHOP: Yes. 
21 THE COURT: Hold on just a second. There is in 
22 the file a Minute Entry which reflects my recollection of 
23 what happened during that phone conference. Correct me if 
24 I'm wrong. 
25 The matter came before me on — during a 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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1 telephonic conference en the motion to continue of 
2 Mr. Holm, representing that he needed to continue the 
3 matter because he wanted to prepare and file an Amended 
4 Complaint. There is a copy of an Amended Complaint 
5 unsigned attached to his motion, but there is no motion to 
6 amend the Complaint in the file, and I don't recall one 
7 ever being made. 
8 MR. BISHOP: I have a copy, and one was made. 
9 THE COURT: I don't see it in the file. 
10 Do you have a copy? 
11 MR. BISHOP: Let me — 
12 MR. HOLM: I do. 
13 I MR. BISHOP: Yeah. I'm sure you do. And I do 
14 too. 
15 | THE COURT: You do? I'd like to see it, because 
16 I it didn't reach the file. 
17 MR. BISHOP: There it is. Yeah. 
18 THE COURT: Where's the copy of the Amended 
19 Complaint? Was that the same one that you attached to your 
20 motion for continuance? 
21 MR. HOLM: Well, it should have been attached to 
22 the motion for leave to amend, but that's the original 
2 3 Amended Complaint, Your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Okay. And this one is also 
25 unsigned. 
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In any case, this motion and this discussion 
occurred — when? — last Friday, was it? 
MR. BISHOP: Thursday, I believe. 
MR. HOLM: Thursday, I believe, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thursday. 
MR. HOLM: I wasn't present, of course. 
Mr. Park handled that. 
THE COURT: On 5-26. Which would have been last 
Wednesday was when we had our conference. 
And at that time, as I recall, I indicated that 
I was not inclined to grant a continuance for the — so 
that Mr. Holm could amend pleadings, in view of the fact 
that the trial v/as set for today, and I considered that too 
late. And if that's what your order says, I'll gladly 
execute it. It has been approved by Mr. Park — 
MR. BISHOP: It has. 
THE COURT: — which makes me wonder is Mr. Park 
representing the plaintiff in this matter? 
MR. HOLM: No. He asked — he just stood in in 
my stead on that motion. 
THE 
it as well? 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
COURT: Do you want to review this 
HOLM: I can certainly sign off on 
BISHOP: He has seen it. 
HOLM: If he has signed off on it, 
and sign 
it. 
I can 
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1 certainly do the same. 
MR. BISHOP: 
1 very succinctly stated 
the right 
can get a 
THE COURT: 
attorney on 
MR. BISHOP: 
To quote Mr. Park this morning, 
that' rs what happened. 
All right. 
there 
I think we ought to 
Thank you. 
Would you 
conformed copy? 
MR. 
THE 
HOLM: 
COURT: 
approved the order, I' 
copy, too, 
Thank you 
MR. BISHOP: 
r so we have 
THE 
• 
MR. 
THE 
the Complaint, 
is a copy 
amend. 
COURT: 
BISHOP: 
COURT: 
Sure. 
All right. 
do the copy, too, so 
Both sides having 
11 execute it. 
We'd like 
a conformed 
All right. 
Thank you 
he | 
get 
we 
the Court to sign the 
copy. 
It's been executed. 
» 
Let me return your original and 
Mr. Holm, so 
of that Complaint 
MR. 
THE 
try the matter 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
HOLM: 
COURT: 
, then? 
BISHOP: 
HOLM: 
COURT: 
Thank 
All : 
Yes 
Yes. 
Okay 
then 
the record is clear. And there 
attached to your motion to 
you. 
right. 
, sir. 
. Mr. 
Are both sides ready to 
Holm, do you wish to make 
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an opening statement? 
MR. HOLM: Briefly, Your Honor. This is a case 
where I guess you would call it a common-law divorce. 
Obviously by that very statement, I've indicated what the 
key issue we believe in the case to be, and that is whether 
there was a common-law marriage. 
The parties were — set up shop together, I 
guess you could say, in 1982, I believe it was. 
MS. BUNCH: '79. 
MR. HOLM: 1979. I'm sorry. My client has 
corrected me on that. And were together until 1990. Some 
11 years. 
The evidence is going to show that during that 
period of time, they behaved as if they were husband and 
wife. Family and friends, of course, knew that they 
weren't formally involved in a solemnized marriage, but 
they behaved as if they were husband and wife. 
We are going to have evidence to the effect that 
they purchased property together; that they, of course, 
shared expenses; that they lived together, of course, and 
that they behaved as if they were husband and wife. 
Specifically, two .of Mrs. Bunch's siblings — 
Miss Bunch's — Miss Bunch's siblings are going to testify 
that on one occasion, when Miss Bunch graduated from 
Southern Utah University, that at that time, they were 
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together in the home, and Mr. Englehorn at that time stated 
that the parties were married as common-law husband and 
wife. 
That also at that time, Mr. Englehorn signed a 
deed to the property that the parties purchased here in 
Parowan in favor of both of them jointly, and that they 
were witnesses to that deed, and that that deed — we have 
the original here for the Court, of course, that 
establishes again that they were purchasing property 
together and again behaving as if they were husband and 
wife. 
There's also going to be some bank records that 
we're going to show — use to show that Miss Bunch 
contributed toward the purchase of that home. Contributed 
toward mortgage payments; contributed to the down payment. 
Paid some $2,000 toward the down payment of that home. All 
to establish that there was a common-law marriage. 
There, of course, will also be testimony 
regarding various items of personal property that the 
parties purchased together. And, of course, the Court is 
going to need to divide that equitably. 
Other than the debt on the home, there's not 
going to be any debt that the Court is going to have to 
divide and apportion between the parties. That appears to 
be the only debt is the debt related to the home. 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
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There will be some testimony regarding some 
difficulties that the parties have had — some harassment 
and so on on the part of Mr. Englehorn — which we believe 
would entitle Miss Bunch to a restraining order — 
permanent injunction against him from vexing or harassing 
her. And based upon that evidence, Your Honor, we believe 
that the Court can make a determination to equitably divide 
the property of the parties and get these parties divorced 
as if they were married in a solemnized marriage. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Do you wish to make an opening 
statement now, Mr. Bishop? 
MR. BISHOP: Yes, Your Honor, I do. 
The defense, of course, disagrees with that 
opening statement, as you may have been able to glean from 
the pleadings in this case. 
Before getting into the situation as to what we 
believe the facts will show, we'd like to call the Court's 
attention to Utah Code Annotated 30-1-4.5. I've provided 
the Court with a copy, along with a copy of cases which 
annotate that since its passage in 1957. 
There are some elements that we think the Court 
is going to have to watch for as we go into the evidence. 
The first is whether or not there was ever a contract of 
marriage. We think the evidence will show that there was 
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not. We don't think the evidence will show that there 
were — was any consent to any marriage by the parties. 
We'll admit that the parties were capable of giving 
consent. They're both competent individuals. We'll admit 
that they were legally capable of entering a solemnized 
marriage. We will admit that they have cohabited. 
However, we believe the evidence will show that the 
cohabitation that occurred in this situation was not the 
sort that occurs in a marriage. That it was a very much on 
and off again thing, and that basically it occurred during 
the wintertime and the early spring when Miss Bunch was 
working in Brian Head, and that when her employment 
terminated at Brian Head — when the ski season ended, that 
she would disappear into California where she carried on 
her own thing and her own relationships apart from 
Mr. Englehorn. 
The evidence will also show that during the 
period of time that she asserts she was married, that she 
had relationships with other men in this area also, all of 
which go to establish that there was no intent of the 
parties to act as husband and wife. 
We don't believe the evidence will show that 
there was any mutual assumption of marital rights, duties 
and obligations. Specifically Mr. Englehorn denies the 
assertion made by counsel that at any time he held him or 
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Miss Bunch out as being married to anyone. 
Further, the evidence will show that at no time 
have the parties acquired a general and uniform reputation 
as husband and wife. We think that the evidence will show 
that whatever the relationship was — and it certainly 
wasn't that of husband and wife — it commenced in '78 or 
'79 and continued on an on and off again basis until about 
the 17th of August of 1990, when there was a blowup between 
the parties. 
We believe the evidence v/ill show that everyone 
who knew the parties knew that they were not husband and 
wife. They were never reputed to be husband and wife; they 
didn't act as husband and wife. 
Contrary to the opening statement of counsel, we 
believe the evidence v/ill shov/ that the parties did not buy 
real property together. There are two pieces of property 
that are involved. One of them is a lot in I think it's 
called Castle Valley Ranches over in Grand County that was 
purchased in 1981 by Mr. Englehorn. And all the documents 
related to that show that he purchased it as a single man. 
There was a home that he purchased in 1982 here 
in Parowan. The evidence will show, contrary to counsel's 
statement, that at that time, in order to obtain the $5,000 
down payment that he needed, he borrowed money from 
Mr. Michael Gclden to the tune of $500 and some money from 
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his father. He did, in fact, borrow $500 from Miss Bunch 
to allow him to complete the amount he needed for the down 
payment, but that was a loan that was paid back to her. 
The evidence will show that throughout the period of the 
relationship, he was the one that paid for these pieces of 
property. They're his. 
And there's a deed that counsel talked about. 
It's a warranty deed that appears to be dated the 3 0th of 
May of 1986. Now, there's some real questions about that 
document. Mr. Englehorn denies ever having signed that 
document or ever having delivered it to Miss Bunch. The 
evidence will show that when you look at that document on 
its face, it raises questions. There is a signature that 
purports to be the signature of Mr. Englehorn, but it's not 
placed normally as it would be placed on a deed if you or I 
were going to sign it. The evidence will show that that 
deed is not his signature. 
We have an expert who will appear and testify — 
Mr. George Throckmorton — who's analyzed the document and 
will say that it's not Mr. Englehorn's signature. 
All in all, v/e don't believe that the plaintiff 
will be able to meet her burden with respect to 
establishing the existence of a — I don't suppose that we 
really should call it a common-law marriage, because it's 
not. It's not a creature of the common law, it's a 
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creature of statute here in the state of Utah. But we 
don't believe she'll be able to establish those elements. 
We'll ask the Court to look at the time periods 
involved, because at the close of Plaintiff's case, I'll 
have a motion to make with respect to that. 
And that would leave the only other issue as to 
whether or not she has an interest in the home in Parowan 
by reason of that deed. And we think that the evidence 
will show that no, she does not, because that deed was not 
ever signed by Mr. Englehorn. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. I note in your opening 
statements that neither of you has addressed Paragraph (2) 
of 30-1-4.5. 
MR. BISHOP: That's the time function, Your 
Honor. And that's the motion I referred to at the end, 
that I will make at the end of Plaintiff's case. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm interested in knowing what 
the plaintiff's position is on that before we start taking 
evidence. 
MR. HOLM: I believe we're saying that the 
separation occurred, as I read the Complaint — 
THE COURT: In August of 1990? 
MR. HOLM: — in August of 1990. And the 
Complaint was filed within a year of that time. 
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MR. BISHOP: Why don't I make that — 
THE COURT: This doesn't refer to the filing of 
a Complaint, it refers to a determination or establishment 
of the marriage, which must occur within one year after the 
breakup. It does not appear to me that you can meet your 
threshold burden. 
MR. BISHOP: Let me make that motion now, Your 
Honor. 
Based on counsel's opening statement, we move to 
dismiss any claims based upon a common-law marriage based 
upon Subsection (2) of the statute — 
MR. HOLM: I may have misread that. 
MR. BISHOP: — for the reason that by her own 
admission and statement, the relationship — even if there 
were such a relationship — which we don't admit — 
terminated in the middle of August of 1990. And as of this 
date in 1993, there has never been any establishment by an 
administrative agency or by the Court that such a 
relationship constituted a statutory marriage. 
THE COURT: Mr. Holm? 
MR. HOLM: Well, I — I guess I'm confused. 
I — I thought filing a Complaint was to — 
MR. BISHOP: No. 
MR. HOLM: — to accomplish that very purpose to 
have that determination made. And because the trial has 
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now occurred much more than a year since the relationship 
terminated, I can't see how that would — that should 
prejudice Miss Bunch simply because the trial has now 
occurred more than a year after. 
THE COURT: I don't see any authority there that 
says that the time is tolled from — from the point when 
you file a Complaint. 
MR. HOLM: Well — 
THE COURT: It says clearly that the 
determination or establishment of the marriage must occur 
within the relationship or within one year following the 
termination of the relationship. And admittedly by the 
facts, it hasn't occur, has it? 
MR. HOLM: Well — if that's the way you're 
going to interpret the statute, then I'm going to have to 
admit that, yes. But I — I guess I would have some 
concerns about the constitutionality of such a statute when 
it would make it — when a person files a Complaint to have 
that determination made, and simply because of the delays 
and court time and that sort of thing, it can't get it to 
court. 
to court? 
THE COURT: Well, have you ever tried to get it 
MR. BISHOP: No. 
THE COURT: Have you ever made a motion to 
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establish the marriage in this case? 
MR. HOLM: I have not. I'm only in the case for 
a month. 
THE COURT: I understand. And nobody else has 
either. And I don't think that's a constitutional 
question, because I think you're entitled to bring a motion 
right at the outset of the case to have the Court examine 
this very issue and determine whether or not there's a 
valid marriage and establish that before we proceed with 
the issue of whether you can get a divorce. 
MR. HOLM: Well, if that's the interpretation of 
the statute, then I've got to — to concede that I don't 
have anything to contest that. I — but I guess I've 
misconstrued it or — 
THE COURT: It's something that I can't find any 
cases on. 
Have either of you seen any previous — 
MR. HOLM: I'm not aware of any case law. 
THE COURT: — cases construing that? 
MR. BISHOP: There is not on this particular 
case in the state of Utah. However, there is case law 
which did argue the same point. And it's in those 
documents I've given you. Basically what the Court of 
Appeals has said is that if — 
THE COURT: Which case are we talking about? 
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MR. BISHOP: I can't point a finger at it right 
now, but it's in that — in those four cases that I gave 
you. It operated under a different fact situation. We had 
two or three situations in those cases where the trial 
courts wanted very much to establish a common-law 
marriage. And they tried to do so where it had commenced 
before the effective date of the statute. And in each and 
every case, the Court of Appeals has said, "No. You can't 
do that." Prior to that time, and even in one of them, it 
said there's a lack of subject matter jurisdiction to do 
that, because until the effective date of the statute, the 
Court, under the prior statutes that were in effect in the 
state of Utah, had no subject matter jurisdiction to 
declare a common-law marriage. 
THE COURT: Yes. I've read those cases. 
Well, I guess the first question is whether we 
have the facts sufficiently straight that we are able to 
rule on the motion Mr. Bishop has just raised. 
MR. HOLM: And I — of course it gets — that's 
the very reason I filed the motion to amend the Complaint 
is because of that concern. And maybe it's more 
appropriate — I mean I — I've got some concerns about 
res judicata, but I would rather proceed on the Amended 
Complaint — much rather — because of those concerns. 
THE COURT: You were hired a month ago; is that 
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correct? 
MR. HOLM: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you acted very expeditiously to 
get an Amended Complaint in the file, even though the case 
has been pending for a couple years? 
MR. HOLM: Yes. 
THE COURT: However, I've ruled on your motion 
to amend the Complaint, and I think properly so. And even 
if I grant Mr. Bishop's motion, I think you can still raise 
those issues in a new lawsuit. 
MR. HOLM: Okay. 
THE COURT: And I don't think these issues have 
been precluded by any rule I make today. 
MR. HOLM: That's my concern. I don't want to 
have a res judicata effect of — 
THE COURT: Well, they'd be totally different 
claims. The only thing in the Complaint before me now is a 
claim for divorce; isn't that correct? 
MR. HOLM: Yes. 
MR. BISHOP: That's right. 
THE COURT: And if I rule there's no marriage, 
then the only thing that's res judicata is that ruling. 
Give me just a moment here. 
Well, does either side wish to research the 
issue further, or did you want to just submit it for 
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decision? 
MR. BISHOP: We'll submit it for decision. 
MR. HOLM: Well, I'm afraid that I'm not going 
to find anything in Utah law — 
MR. BISHOP: That's true. He won't. 
MR. HOLM: — on the issue, Your Honor. So I 
think it's one of first impression, basically. 
THE COURT: Well, part of the problem is we're 
dealing with a statute which is of relatively recent 
origin. It was passed in '87, as I understand the law, and 
really hasn't been interpreted much in the state. It's a 
really tough statute to apply, and it requires a — quite a 
forceful showing even to meet all the elements which 
Mr. Bishop has pointed out. 
But Paragraph (2) seems to govern this case 
right at the outset. And it requires that there has to be 
some determination or establishment of a marriage during 
that marriage — or whatever that relationship is — within 
one year following the termination of the relationship. 
And as I understand the facts in this case, the parties 
separated in August of 1990, and so any relationship that 
would have been in existence terminated on that date, and 
we are now almost two years downstream from that. 
MR. BISHOP: Three years, almost. 
THE COURT: Three years downstream from that. 
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So clearly there was no determination or establishment of 
the marriage under this section within one year from the 
termination of the relationship. And based upon that, I 
find that 30-1-4.5 does not apply, and that there was no 
valid marriage established under the meaning — within the 
meaning of that statute. 
MR. BISHOP: Given that, Your Honor, we ask that 
the Complaint be dismissed. 
THE COURT: Mr. Holm, did you have anything 
else? 
MR. HOLM: No. Submit it. 
THE COURT: The only thing in the Complaint is a 
claim for divorce, as I understand. And the Court having 
ruled that there was no valid marriage, the Complaint is 
inappropriate, and there are no grounds for that Complaint, 
and it's ordered dismissed. 
MR. BISHOP: With prejudice, as I understand? 
THE COURT: Well, I think this is a — a ruling 
on the question of whether or not there's been a — 
MR. BISHOP: Sure. 
THE COURT: — a termination of a marriage under 
that statute. 
MR. BISHOP: Right. 
THE COURT: Insofar as that ruling is concerned, 
it is with prejudice. 
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MR- BISHOP: Yes, sir. I understand that. 
MR. HOLM: Could we have specific findings, Your 
Honor? Maybe we can test it — 
THE COURT: You certainly may. 
MR. HOLM: — with this case. 
THE COURT: And I'm going to ask Mr. Bishop to 
prepare those — 
MR. BISHOP: I will. 
THE COURT: — and submit them for my signature. 
MR. BISHOP: Fine. 
THE COURT: The findings would be relatively 
simple. That the parties agree that the breakup of this 
relationship occurred in August of 1990, and there's been 
no determination within the meaning of the statute, and 
that's the only thing I've ruled on. 
MR. BISHOP: Yeah. One other — one other 
thing. I will — the motion is based upon counsel's 
opening statement not upon any testimony that came from the 
witness stand. And I'll include that. 
I will also include that counsel's opening 
statement indicated that the marriage — or the so-called 
relationship, whatever it was, began in 1989. 
Is that appropriate? 
MR. HOLM: If you'll stipulate to that. I think 
that's --
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MR. BISHOP: Well, our testimony might show it 
began a little earlier, if we got to that. But I think it 
has — if we are going to talk about an appeal, I think 
that it has a bearing on it. Because as I read the case 
law, even if you get to the situation where a determination 
is to be made within one year, the breakup of the 
relationship, as I read the case law — if the relationship 
started before the effective date of the statute, still you 
can't do anything. 
THE COURT: Let me just say that my ruling is 
based on more than counsel's opening statement, it's based 
on the Verified Complaint which contains the recital of 
these very facts. Paragraph 2 of the Verified Complaint 
alleges that the parties broke up on August 18th, 1990. 
And so that's the — that's the basis of my 
ruling is the plaintiff's pleadings indicate that more than 
a year has passed with no determination since the 
termination of the relationship. And you can include that 
in your order as well. 
MR. BISHOP: Thank you. At this point, 
plaintiff having prevailed on the Complaint, as I read it, 
it may be appropriate to submit the question of attorney 
fees for the defendant under 78-27-56. 
Would the Court prefer to do that now or at 
another time? 
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THE COURT: Well, it would seem to me that you 
can probably do that in writing. 
Were you prepared to do that today as to time 
and so forth? 
MR. BISHOP: We'll do that in writing. 
THE COURT: You're moving under the — on the 
grounds that this was a frivolous Complaint? 
MR. BISHOP: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Why don't you — 
MR. BISHOP: I'll do that in writing. 
THE COURT: — file that in motion form so 
Mr. Holm has time to respond to that. 
MR. BISHOP: Okay. I'll give Mr. Holm an 
opportunity to respond to it. 
THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else 
we need to deal with today? 
MR. BISHOP: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you all for coming. We're in 
recess. 
(Whereupon the proceedings in the above-entitled 
matter were concluded at 9:28 A.M.) 
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I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, an Official Court 
Reporter in and for the Fifth Judicial District, State of 
Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing matter, to wit, BARBARA LYNN 
BUNCH VS. BRIAN LYNN ENGLEHORN, CIVIL NO. 914900057, was 
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under my direction. 
I further testify that I am not interested in 
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STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH, 
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BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN, 
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2. On or about November 8, 1993, an individual identified through 
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Impecuniosity" and another entitled "Affidavit Support Impecuniosity Request". Copies of 
both documents are attached, and are incorporated by this reference. 
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that she, herself, put the actual date of the appearance and signing on the documents when 
Affiant notarized them. 
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Bunch. 
6. Affiant does not personally know Barbara Lynn Bunch, and identified her only 
by her Utah driver's license, No. 14616368. 
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BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY 
Civil No. 914900057 
COURT OF APPEALS # 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §21-7-3, I, Barbara Lynn 
Bunch, do solemnly affirm that due to my poverty I am unable to 
bear the expenses of the action or legal proceedings which I am 
about to commence, and that I believe I am justly entitled to the 
relief sought by such action or legal proceedings. 
DATED this S ,tk day of fj) O^JL^^IJUUL^ 1993. 
^ 
y 
J-uLL ^s l^< 
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH 
Affiant 
uiP£3 
In the County of <Oivry\nni"i , State of Utah, on this 
9>'n day of \ irA)P/rYlu£( 19S3, before me, the undersigned 
notary, personally appeared TSafhryr(X L i n n 
who is personally known to me or: "who proved to me her identity 
through documentary evidence in the form o^ a ljk\)l ^ MU\ lp.'V^ Q% 
to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence 
and who swore or affirmed to me tnat the signature is voluntary 
and the document truthful. 
"AKY PL 3 L ' C 
4&S& ^fcSA SIBERIANS 
:.Y,v!! £VT;\ tt»i <~S< AVE. ?0. dOX 16 
j?['^.".i-.Vj3} PAKK Cn* b ^ f .34060 
V'X^r iV v> CCMM.3:.C%: £* P'PiS 
LT-H 
My Commission Exoires 
.w)tA\5 'AQfl 
//u. -^ &A< 
Residing a t : ^,utYrH{J (^tn^CT r 
044 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
By: Stephen W. Julien, Bar No. 1765 
216 South 200 West 
P.O. Box 1538 
Cedar C i t y , Utah 84720 
Telephone: (801) 586-2571 
A t t o rneys f o r P l a i n t i f f / A p p e l l a n t 
FILED 
FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
' 9 3 NOU 10 PH 12 33 
IRON COUNTY 
BY j£<L^ 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA LYNN BUNCH, 
PIai nti ff/Appe11 ant, 
vs. 
BRIAN LYNN ENGELHORN, 
Defendant/Appel1ee. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
AFFIDAVIT SUPPORTING 
IMPECUNIOSITY REQUEST 
Civil No. 914900057 
COURT OF APPEALS # 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF ) 
ss, 
COMES NOW Barbara Lynn Bunch, upon being duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1 . I am indi gent and bel ieve that I am entitled to file 
papers at the Fifth District Court without paying filing fees. 
2. I am employed by UIA <?.y*\ rft (o^pX , and 
earn at the rate of $_ 
hour, day, week, month. 
per (please circle one) 
3. I received as my last income tne sum of $ / ,A^ [ ./ ^  
which was my pay for the period of ^0 A/ Th? ^ / 0/ °[ , 
0^£^- X^io.ij IP/ft- (OfAZ O&ru^cfC , 1992. 
4. I earned the sum total of $ \}Cco 
during the calendar year 1992. 
5. I am unemployed and have been since 
6. I receive unemployment/workers compensation in the 
following amounts: $ {P\\\ r^ ae-vo^  \J0rkgr5 0 ,<D^IQ . C L cLo^ i"" /<v 
7. I receive no income from employment, unemployment, 
compensation or workers compensation, I am supocrted by: 
8. I own the following real property: 
9. I own the following automoDiles or other motor 
vehicles: ft&D S ^ U 
10. I own the following personal property: 
a) F i rearms: " 
b) Boats: 
c) Spo r t i ng goods: o? &Q?r- s i C t Y s (QQC^A^M'A n f f s ^ 
d) Jewe l ry : \ K S \jg.ry U*U~U 
e) Other: 
11. I have bank accounts with 
a) Savings account: Q 
0v
^i 
D ) Check ing a c c o u n t : l"~v"f e > V " i P e c ^ f Y N i LJ)c^ (< 
c) O the r : 
The balance in each of the accounts are: 
a) Savings: Q 
4 b) Checking: * [ 1 Co 
13. My m a r i t a l s ta tus i s : S ivy#L 
14. My dependents by name and age are: 
D 
15. My monthly expenses are as follows: 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
f) 
9) 
Rent or house payment 
Food and household: 
Electricity: 
Gas: 
Water, Sewer, Garbage, etc. 
Clothing: 
Monthly debt payments (list) 
$ 
$ . 
$ . 
$ . 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
$ 
^UP 
1 QQ** 
t •vcj cid <tcL 
. ^ c„'M,d<. 4. 
1 n c UUi. 
_3 
16. The financial statement provided herein is true and 
correct. In order to complete this statement, I have added 
Q (enter number of pages) additional pages. 
17. I understand that I am submitting and signing this 
Affidavit on penalty of perjury. This means that if I have given 
3 047 
J u I C I) 
false information in this Affidavit I could be prosecuted for other 
offenses against the State of Utah. 
DATED this 3 &L day of yj r ^ ^ ^ W ^ £f\j-Q-W^K 1993 
/ 
Barbara Lyqjj- Bun'ch, Affiant 
In the County of QIk/yy\/rn^A^\ , State of Utah, on this 
n day of \\)np/ry\hg.f 1993, before me, the undersigned 
notary, personally appeared ,Qxrbo.fC>, Urn Q QVKOCV^ 
who is personally known to me or: "who proved to me her identity 
through documentary evidence in the form cf a \j^.PL, 1*4 \fAlo?>is>% 
to be the person who signed the preceding document in my presence 
and who swore or affirmed to me that the signature is voluntary 
and the document truthful. 
NOTARY PLBi'C 
TtkSSA SLNDEKUNO 
A / ^ ^ A V - \ 1S14 M K AVE. P.O. BOX 1650 
<3 '-*&*?k\ PAW a™ ^TA^ &W60 
\< \V - Vr .{7 COMMISSION EXPIRES 
v - . . , •* / JULY 5, 1997 
sw\ or LT\H 
NOTA 
^ Z ^ £ 
Re s i d i n g - a t : ^ ^ . ^ J f j_o etu^L 
My Commission Expires: 
4 0 u 04fc 
